

Jihadi issues in Pakistan and the Middle East

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Abstract

The development of extremism in Pakistan historically In Pakistan, there is a wide range of Islamic interpretations and worldviews. Approximately 77% of Pakistan's population is Sunni, and 22% is Shia. There are about 3% non-Muslims. These include the Parsi minority, Christianity, and Hinduism. The Ahmadi community, who identify as Muslims but are categorically rejected by the state, is also included in this figure. Pakistan's nationhood is based on the two-state hypothesis. The two nations' philosophies are firmly based on Islam and Islamic principles. The key topic of discussion today is how radical groups and secular Pakistanis view the two-state doctrine. Although there has never been an Islamic infrastructure to support their cause, many academics claim that the majority of people exhibit some extremist traits. They have both today. A lengthy discussion that cannot be covered in this chapter is how Pakistan has changed throughout the years. Pakistan was always a Muslim nation. Islam, however, has never had a significant influence on national administration. The pre-eminence of Islam in Pakistan was clearly denied by Jinnah in his speech on August 11, 1947 (Stern, 2000).

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1. Middle Eastern and Pakistani jihadi concerns

Understanding the jihadi groups' historical origins is important because it shows that they are more than just criminals who are adding to the havoc in Pakistan; rather, they are people whose ideas and methods have been developed over many years. By their very actions, these organisations cast doubt on the place of Islam, and specifically what form of Islam, in the current state of Pakistan. Furthermore, their acts are paralleling the current situation of Sunni brethren in the Middle East because to their belief that Pakistan is an Islamic caliphate and their worldview of not allowing Shia interpretations of Islam. The tremendous violence of Al-Qaida and the Islamic State still fascinates people all about the world. Although jihadi organisation tactics and ideology have received a lot of attention, this is the first book to examine their cultural practises. The playwrights study what occurs within these groups and what a day in the life of a foot soldier is like using a variety of original materials (Ram, 2013). They demonstrate that Islamist terrorists are much more than just fighters and athletes and have a vibrant artistic culture. Poetry, music, and unexpected activities like dream interpretation and sobbing are all part of daily life in a jihadi group. Readers will gain a completely new understanding of radical Islamists, learning that despite their stereotype of being macho guys, they respect aesthetic sensibility, humility, and emotional expressions (Shay, 2017).

Cultural practises are crucial for comprehending the jihadi worldview and may provide critical new insight into the recruitment and decision-making procedures used by extremist organisations. Anyone who is intrigued by the allure and tenacity of the jihadi movement in academia, government, or the general public will want to read this unique book. "Religion has nothing to do with state issues," they assert, referring to government. He wants to see Pakistan develop into a moderate, secular, and progressive nation. The nature of sectarian violence in Pakistan has evolved throughout time. The majority of the killings occurred in Punjab up to the mid-1990s. Although there were more incidences in Balochistan, Northwest Frontier Province, and Karachi by the end of the 1990s. Sectarian tension is highest in Karachi, followed by FATA and Dra Ismail Khan. Karachi has the most sectarian confrontations. In recent years, targeted sectarian terrorism in Karachi has also claimed the lives of over 100 doctors and attorneys in addition to international institutions and places of worship.

2. Jihadi issues in Pakistan and the Middle East

(Holton, 2000). The stability of Pakistan and the neighbouring area is seriously threatened by jihadi groups there. Beyond the tribal regions, their operations and influence have reached Pakistan's cities. Pakistan has joined nations like Syria and Iraq as a site of theological disputes between Shia and Sunni Muslims, indicating that local conflicts have grown to be connected to the more pervasive and violent sectarianism in the Middle East. This shifting makeup of Pakistan's "Jihadi issue" shows that, despite the fact that jihadi organisations may have local bases of operations, their ideologies are more global in scope and closely tied to the Middle East and the many wars taking place there. The jihadi organisations, most notably Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), are now strong enough to exert influence outside of tribal areas in significant urban centres. They have not only been active in Quetta and Peshawar for some time, but they are also enforcing the law and sowing fear in Karachi, which accounts for a fourth of Pakistan's GDP. Politically speaking, Karachi's ease of operation is significant because it indicates that political groups like the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), Pakistan People's Party (PPP), and Awami National Party (ANP) are being replaced, which would limit Pakistanis' access to the political system.

(Farooqi, 2022). The TTP urged Pakistanis in an open letter to abstain from voting since doing so would just mean more of the same if they were required to join any party meetings, to stay away from those hosted by the MQM, ANP, and PPP of corrupt governance of the Western sort. Threats have resulted in the secular ANP, which up until now has served as Pashtuns' representative in Pakistan, being obliged to canvass homes instead of staging political rallies. The sectarian Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) has forged a political alliance with the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz faction (PML-N) in Punjab, demonstrating that it not only has a support base but also the political clout to work with the ruling party (Hegghammer, 2009). These developments show that jihadi and sectarian organisations now have widespread esteem and can no longer be viewed as ordinary jihadi foot soldiers that the state apparatus can manipulate. Slowly but gradually, they are creating support bases by inciting fear or both, among Pakistani citizens.

The current Shia-Sunni war in the Middle East has spread into Pakistan, further complicating the situation. Concerning is the growing trend of targeting Pakistan's Shia minority for ideological and tactical grounds to exact revenge on them for the wrongs done to Sunnis by the Alawite dictatorship in Syria and the slights they endured under the Shia government in Iraq (Fishman, 2011). It demonstrates how local sectarian groups' religious reasons are in line with the objectives of international organisations like Al Qaeda, which believe in sowing discord in the already unstable countries of Syria and Iraq.

3. Theoretical elements in Islamic education

In decision, the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East, which has been evident in Iraq and Syria and which continues to threaten to affect other nations of the region as well, is linked to the jihadi problem and postures an insurmountable problem not only to terms of the future of, and the role of, Islam (as well as the dominant explanation of spirituality) in Pakistan. It is crucial for policymakers in Pakistan and abroad to comprehend the nature of the "jihadi dilemma" as going beyond the discussion of terrorism and counterterrorism, as well as the rule of law and its absence. Theoretically, neither all Shi'as nor all extreme organisations can be tried in court. Instead, it's important to comprehend the complex "jihadi dilemma" that

Pakistan and the region. To work with Middle Eastern nations to stop a Shia-Sunni firestorm that spreads across the entire Muslim world, it is necessary to understand the connections between national and global challenges. Last but not least, decision-makers should consider the Pakistani populace, who can either be the country's undoing if their allegiances are shifted to players outside the state or can offer the chance to turn things around if their energies are utilized. Pakistan needs to increase spending in the care sector and enhance national governance. People will be forced to look to actors who will provide for them if the government refuses to meet their necessities (Kalyvas, 2018).

That might turn out to be devastating for Pakistan and harmful for its close neighbours and the rest of the world. Understanding the distinctions between the two concepts of Quran and Islamic instruction is crucial. The Quran School or Maktab is a facility where Muslim children only read and recite the Quran. A mosque, a tree, a Quran teacher's home, or the open sky are all suitable locations for the Quran Conservatory. In structured institutions with variously skilled lecturers and classrooms, the name "Madrassah" is frequently used. Additionally, Islamic schools offer more in-depth religious education while Koran schools often only teach the basics of religion, such as how to recite and pronounce the Koran. Islamic schools differ regionally in terms of their organisational structure and operational practises. The majority of Islamic education in West Africa is taught in Maktab or Koranic institutions. Few students in Islamic schools in West Africa receive thorough instruction in Islam. Governments that supervise the curriculum and make sure that some secular subjects are offered in these institutions subsidise the majority of Islamic schools in the Arab East (Yambert, 2016).

The governments of Indonesia and Malaysia operate in a manner similar to those of the Arab world. Although the Special Committee for Religious Education under the Ministry of Religious Affairs provides funding for a significant number of religious schools in South Asia, these institutions are allowed to seek out additional support from private donors. Thus, the majority of Islamic institutions in Pakistan only impart religious topics. However, the issue with Islamic schooling has two major facets. The first is the level of instruction that the second is the extremist armed groups that some Islamic schools battle against internationally or in sects, by giving students the fundamental means to earn a life link between them. Conflict. These are two distinct issues that require two distinct approaches. It's crucial to remember that nothing taught in Islamic schools promotes violence. The majority of studies suggest that only 10 to 15 percent of Pakistani Islamic schools are affiliated with extremist terrorist groups, despite the difficulty in obtaining precise data (Pillar, 2016).

4. The systemic growth of Islamic institutions of learning

(Choudhury & Hoque, 2006). Doctrinal disagreements between Sunnis and Shias have escalated into a full-fledged conflict in Pakistan since the 1980s. Particularly since the revolution in the neighbouring country of Iran, the nation has likewise evolved into a battleground for the opposing beliefs of Sunni and Shia Islam. According to a US diplomatic cable made public by Wikileaks some of the extreme religious seminaries that are to blame for the establishment of an extremist recruitment network in Punjab province get an estimated \$100 million year from donations from the Gulf. Vali Nasr explains how this issue came to be "South Asia in general, and Pakistan in particular, served as the principal theatre of the Saudi-Iranian and Sunni-Shia confrontation in the 1980s and 1990s. Compared to the Arab nations, India and Pakistan were much more susceptible to Shia assertiveness. Iran first concentrated its attention on Pakistan. There, as opposed to the scenario along the Iran-Iraq border, the outcome would be determined by ideological campaigns and social unrest motivated by sectarian bloodshed. The Sunni ulama in India and Pakistan became more motivated to respond the more forcefully Iran tried to sway the Shia populations in those nations. The Sunnis started to develop after Iran gathered Shia youth into student organisations and helped establish a Pakistani Shia party modelled after Lebanon's Amal.

(Choudhury & Harahap, 2009). The number of Islamic schools was extremely low in the 1980s, but it quickly increased afterward President Zia consented to assist the United States in preparing jihadists in Afghanistan to fight the Soviet Union. About 3.5 billion dollars were invested in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the Afghanistan War by the US and Saudi Arabia. The number of Islamic schools in Pakistan has grown quickly, particularly in the refugee camps for Afghans in the provinces of Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Province, where the Taliban's future commanders are trained. With the intention of enlisting and educating those who can subsequently take part in jihad against the enemies of Islam, certain extreme Islamic

schools advocate jihad and develop a culture of violence. They can't reasonably expect to act any differently after spending ten to fifteen years (their most formative years) studying these courses. These so-called Islamic schools frequently preach a more extremist form of Islam on their newer campuses. Islamic institutions target the underprivileged, unemployed youth, and refugees, brainwashing and preparing them for extremist activity both domestically and overseas.

5. The Growing Jihad Culture in Pakistan

(Choudhury & Harahap, 2008). Invading Afghanistan in 1979, the Soviet Union stunned the entire globe. It altered the balance of power in the area. In sectors that are crucial to its interests, Washington has made significant changes. China thinks that this incursion is a move closer to the Soviet Union. The Xindande Russian aircraft, which is barely 480 kilometres from the Gulf, completely altered the geostrategic landscape of Central and South Asia in a matter of hours. Saudi Arabians also expressed shock. A threat to its energy supplies made the Soviet Union nervous. With India to its east and Soviet armies pressing on its western border, Pakistan is in a very hazardous position. A serious conundrum for President Zia and his ministry of foreign affairs. Everything is even now serious for the Americans, who are still fighting the Cold War and seek to destroy Russia in every way. There was a lot of interest in the Soviets' incursion into this region. Then, in order to aid them, American strategists sought to get Pakistan to engage in jihad (jihad) with the Afghan military organisations. Afghan refugees easily reacted when Pakistan proclaimed jihad against communist pagan pagans.

(Paramboor & Ibrahim, 2018). The majority of them established camp homes along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Additionally, there were brothers from various Muslim nations. The belligerent side of jihad has gained popularity in Pakistani society since this battle is portrayed as Islam's war against the atheistic Soviet communists, it is important to note. Jihad has gained its own momentum in this fight as enough people have joined this cause. The Soviet Union's withdrawal in 1989 and the communist army's loss in Afghanistan did not put an end to jihad. The global jihadists were so well-informed and opposed to the Soviet army, but they weren't properly led. They moved to other parts of the world to fight holy wars after overthrowing the Soviet Union, full of confidence. It is wise to stress at this point that Jamaat-e-Islami leader Qazi Hussain Ahmed is absolutely true when he says, "The war in Afghanistan is the mother of all jihadists (Giani, 2021)." If you analyse his assertion, you will see that he is correct since it shows that Pakistan served as the springboard for jihadists and jihadist culture, which gradually invaded our society and was warmly received by the majority of its members.

6. Jihadist culture threat

(Giani, 2021). These militias drew members from madrassas all around the nation, including those that had been established in the Pashtun region near the Afghan border to prepare soldiers for the Cold War. These militias had the support of all three regimes Islamabad, Riyadh, and briefly, Baghdad as all three considered Iranian presence in Pakistan as a strategic threat. The issue has gotten even more complicated since the days when multiple factions were supported by foreign governments, thanks in part to the involvement of Islamist groups in Afghanistan and India. In addition to being connected to one another for operational convenience, various jihadi groups all have the same objective: creating an Islamic caliphate in Pakistan and elsewhere. The goal of transforming Pakistan into a wholly Islamic state has (Kohlmann, 2006) Party's jihadist organization: The Islamic Party's selection as the Pakistani army's jihadist weapon in Afghanistan sends a clear signal that the launching of jihad is a legitimate political activity. Various jihadist organizations sprouted from the existing Islamic parties. This led to the transformation of jihad into sectarian divisions, which in turn transformed it into social and political conflict, which had a dangerous impact on Pakistan's civil society and government authority. Islamic militant schools: The country's stability is seriously threatened by the role of Islamic schools in providing the workforce to support sectarian wars and as an institution for propagating their ideology. The prevalence of sectarian violence and militant/jihadist Islamic schools has expanded across the nation. Some Islamic parties and jihadist organizations have strong relations. A big number of Islamic schools are run by Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), which is regarded as the best umbrella organisation for sects like Pakistan's Sipah-i-Sahaba and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. Tehrik. Sipah-e-Mohammad is a sectarian group that is present in Jafria, Pakistan. In response to an assault on a religious

assembly in Pindi Gheb Mallohwal, Jaish-e-Mohammed took part in sectarian conflict. After the Soviet Union left Afghanistan, the jihadists released: The jihadists now constitute a significant threat to Pakistan's internal security. In the first place, posts in the Taliban leadership and the military have been filled by thousands of students who received their education in Islamic institutions. It is uncertain how the jihadist doctrine will spread now that the Taliban and Afghanistan are no longer viable havens for jihadist radicals (Kuo, 2012).

(Stern, 2000). Aggression from Islamists or Jihadists can indeed focus internally or alter Pakistan's sociopolitical landscape. These jihadists take the lead in other nearby countries like Afghanistan and are adamant that the liberation of Kashmir is their primary obligation international terrorism the Pakistani administration now needs to deal with the growing internal pressure since 9/11. Second, these radical organization's adopted a winning strategy (used in the Chinese revolution) substituting government institutions with ones connected to their own governments' (e.g., to Cuba). Pakistan's Talibanization, The potential Talibanization of Pakistan has some social elites so worried that it has spawned a brand-new idea of religious threats. The concept of "Talibanization" highlights the likelihood and potential for terrorists to seize power in Pakistan. US Assistant Secretary of State Karl Inderfurth expressed concern that "Pakistan may be Talibanized" during the observation. The populace did, however, show appreciation for the government's most recent stance in favour of the US government's repression and counterterrorism efforts.

(Stern, 2000). The demise of the well-known jihadist group demonstrates the exaggeration of this idea. On the other hand, the fact that the majority of radical cadres from various groups have returned from Afghanistan, Pakistan, or other regions of the world is another factor that is powerfully tied to the establishment of the jihadist culture. Internal security planners who are trying to come up with measures to strike a balance between Western necessities and demographic goals are in a bind as a result of the growing trend of jihadist culture and the strong anti-Western feeling in society. One terrorist declared: "We won't stop, and we'll spread jihad to Pakistan even if India grants us Kashmir. There is already a push in Pakistan to transform it into a wholly Islamic state. Although many people promote Islam, the majority of them are ignorant of its meaning. We anticipate the Taliban This mindset could have a disastrous effect on Pakistan's internal security challenges as well as its honesty in regards to international etiquette. Law and order: The growth of militarism and chauvinism in the nation has also been attributed to jihadist organizations.

(Cozzens, 2008). Regardless of how sacrosanct their mission to raise money and acquire weapons may be, their presence on the nation's political arena is equivalent to allowing various private forces to challenge civil society. They won't think twice about starting an armed struggle with the government, which is aware of the jihadist organization's growing influence, if their interests are challenged. Naturally, the majority of religious groups in the country who operate numerous Islamic schools and advocate jihad have fiercely criticized the recent decision of this administration to support the U.S. war on terrorism. The Numerous protests that continued for several weeks gravely compromised public safety, costing innocent people's lives as well as government and civilian resources property.

(Bloom & Daymon, 2018). This and numerous other examples that have appeared over the past 20 years let us fully comprehend how the rise of the jihadist culture has resulted in a decline in the state of internal security tribal regions The majority of the tribes represented in the government-run Muhammad and Bajju institutions declared that they would not permit any anti-Taliban individuals soldiers or civilians to enter their territories. Some tribes blocked a portion of the historic Silk Road that traders used to convey goods in protest against President Musharraf's pro-American policies between China and Pakistan. 160 Following the fighting between the United States and Pakistani military services in January 2003, South Waziristan gained notice on a global scale. Although it is nominally a part of Pakistan's Federally Administered Native American Area (FATA), it is essentially under the jurisdiction of the three services' intelligence agencies, which is against the wishes of Musharraf and the previous presidents. The arguing Waziri people are out of the control of any organized administration. For their 1980s operations against by the Soviet Union, they relied on sophisticated American-made small arms since they understood the value of having them.

7. Asian Threat and Response to Jihadi Recruitment and Return

(Khosrokhavar, 2015). The Al Qaeda terrorist network expanded throughout Southeast Asia starting in

the early to mid-1990s by establishing local cells to support its international activities and encouraging collaboration amongst local extremist Islamic organizations. The full scope of the massive terrorist network operating throughout the region and connected to Al Qaeda was found out. But as time went on, a number of factors, including increased vigilance and efficient law enforcement, contributed to a steady drop in extremist violence and a weakening of jihadi networks across Southeast Asia. Despite this, jihadi doctrine was still extensively spread, especially in Indonesia. In addition, new groups emerged when the capabilities of some extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, were weakened or torn apart by factionalism. Enter ISIS some of the citizens of Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia have fought in Syria and Iraq, it has been revealed the majority of the ISIS threat to date has been the recruitment of followers through websites and social media? Is similar to for foot infantry.

(Khosrokhavar, 2015). They demonstrate that Islamist terrorists are much more than just fighters and athletes and have a vibrant artistic culture. Poetry, music, and unexpected activities like psychoanalytic theory and sobbing are all a part of daily life in a jihadi group. Readers will gain a whole different understanding of radical Islamists by learning that, in contrast to their image as muscular males, they cherish modesty, aesthetic sensitivity, and emotional outbursts. Cultural practices are crucial for comprehending the jihadi worldview and may provide critical new insight into the recruitment and decision-making procedures used by extremist organizations. This unique book will appeal to anybody who is fascinated by the allure and tenacity of the jihadi movement in academics, government, or the general public. (From the publisher) Al Qaeda was found out. However, due to a number of variables throughout time, including increased vigilance and better law enforcement, there was a continuous decrease in extremist violence and a strengthening of jihadi networks across Southeast Asia. Despite this, jihadi doctrine was still extensively spread, especially in Indonesia. In addition, new groups emerged when the capabilities of some extremist organizations, such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf in the Philippines, were weakened or torn apart by factionalism. Go to ISIS some of their citizens have served in Syria and Iraq, according to Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. What justifications does ISIS offer?

How much of a presence does ISIS have in Southeast Asia? Has the ISIS threat so far primarily involved online activity? And social networking to gather fans? Or is there proof that ISIS has sent agents to Southeastern Asia and other parts of Asia in to gather foot soldiers? How much have local organizations and people used the ISIS story for their own ends? Has ISIS gained support and recruitment in other parts of the greater Indo-Pacific region? ISIS fighters may ultimately pose a greater threat to South and Southeast Asian nations than they do when they are trained and enlisted to fight in the Middle East (Hegghammer, 2017). What actions have Asian authorities done to fend off the appeal of ISIS? What precautions have they thought of taking or have they already taken to stop returning militants from the Middle East from joining local extremist organizations and reigniting the terrorist threat in the area? The articles in this collection examine these and other issues related to the threat that ISIS's rise poses to Asia and the measures that the regional governments have taken, could take, and ought to take to address the tremendous violence of Al-Qaida and the Islamic State still fascinates people all around the world. Although jihadi organization tactics and ideology have received a lot of attention, this is the first book to examine their cultural practices. The critics analyse what occurs within these groups and what daily life is like using a variety of original sources (Gunaratna & Acharya, 2012).

8. Conclusion

Zia's rule left behind the jihadist movement since the United States created, supported, and funded the first "international jihad" to combat the Soviet Union during the Afghan War. Various groups/sects can make use of motivated, well-trained militants with jihadist experience in Kashmir and Afghanistan. Opposition parties also use these fanatical organizations that have access to significant amounts of unaccounted-for guns and ammunition. It is known that Iran and Saudi Arabia give these organizations' financial and material support, and they are reported to back some of these organizations'. In the past 20 years, hostile neighboring nations have also benefited from sectarianism. A huge number of Islamic schools opened up in Pakistan during the Afghan War with the intention of enlisting.

Jihadist organizations have been crucial in the struggle against non-Muslims, particularly in Afghanistan and more subsequently in Kashmir. However, they won't think twice to use force against the government if they believe that their values are at danger. Islam and jihadist organizations are becoming more

influential on Pakistani politics and religion. This is due to a complicated interaction of external and internal forces. The first is that the public education system is constantly insufficient. As a result, the jihadist organization is free from the inspection and control of the central government to educate the poor and the vulnerable in an increasingly extremist and fundamentalist manner. A military force opposed to subsidies has been established by the growth of armed religious fundamentalists and jihadist groups, contesting and weakening the special function of the military police and military organizations. The increase in sectarianism, the decline in public security, and the economic collapse are the internal driving forces.

This dowries an external portrait of Pakistan as a nation. It worsens relations with the West, especially with its neighbor's, and exports terrorism on a worldwide scale. In light of this, President Musharraf issued his historic address on January 12, 2002, banning the majority of jihadist organizations, with the express aim of limiting their operations in order to prevent the consequences of the jihadist culture mentioned above. The future of Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Pakistan may be significantly imperiled if these jihadist organization's stick to their radical jihadist ideas, which is another crucial matter that requires serious consideration. Pakistan's future is seriously endangered by the way religious parties have reacted to the government's choice to back American efforts to combat terrorism. It must be handled diplomatically and cannot be allowed to offend any faction's religious beliefs. Even while using force is required in tribal areas, it is not a sufficient prerequisite. A military-only approach is insufficient to counter all threats. Pakistan, an ideologically Muslim nation, must grant religious groups enough freedom to prevent them from engaging in violent acts or other behavior that is against the law. Any Extremist groups that employ violence must respond to the use of force with a clear objective in mind.

The leadership must demonstrate resolve and employ all available national resources to neutralize all such threats the study's findings demonstrate that religious intolerance, sectarian conflicts, the emergence of extremist religious movements, and law and order difficulties have all been significant contributors to Pakistan's instability. Sects pose a threat to further undermine Pakistan's failing educational system by enabling religious leaders to exploit unemployed and illiterate youth by misconstruing Islam. In order to confront Islamic terrorism, our nation's security planners whether they be politicians, bureaucrats, or military personnel need to adopt a comprehensive strategy. They also need to start the processes that will lead to the implementation of such solutions over the long term. The threat posed by ostensibly anti-ethnic activity is real.

It is crucial for policymakers in Pakistan and worldwide to comprehend the nature of the "jihad problem" outside of discussions about terrorism against counterterrorism and the rule of law versus its absence. Assume that no Shiite may leave Pakistan and that no extremist organizations can be brought before a court. Instead, it's important to comprehend the multiple "jihad problem" that Pakistan and the region are currently dealing with. To collaborate with Middle Eastern nations and stop the Shia-Sunni conflict from spreading throughout the Muslim world, it is necessary to understand the connection between national and transnational challenges. The Pakistani people should also be taken into account by policymakers. The department will increase its investments and enhance national governance. It poses a threat to both the international community and its neighboring nations.

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