

Analyzing the dynamics of the deadly embrace: a study of Pakistan-US relations from cold war alliances to contemporary challenges

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Abstract

The central theme of this research article is to critically examine the imbalance of the complex nature of the relationship between the two states: a superpower and a small state in a post-colonial environment. It revolves around the complex nature of interdependence in a post-Cold War era. Pakistan was also an ally of the US during the early years of its independence. However, during a short period in its history, Pakistan under Z.A. Bhutto struggled to reduce its dependency on the US. Bhutto's short tenure was not enough to realize this political objective. The departure of Z.A. Bhutto brought back a long military rule in Pakistan. Zia's 11-year rule is a living example of US involvement in constructing the future political profile of Pakistan. This research is an analysis of both states' behavior during the Cold War to War on Terror, which will help the readers to understand the trust deficit and compulsion of both states.

Keywords: Dynamics, Deadly Embrace, Pakistan, Us, Relations, Cold War, Alliances, Contemporary Challenges, Trust Deficit

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1. Introduction

“In 1998 I wrote a memo to President Bill Clinton titled “Pakistan: The Most Dangerous Country in the World (Riedel, 2012).” On this statement there is questioned to be asked it that who made Pakistan most dangerous state for the world? Who is to be blamed for making Pakistan the dangerous state on earth? Three “AAA” Allah, America, or Armed Forces of Pakistan. The history of Pakistan, and the United States (US) relationship took many turns like a roller coaster. starting from the inception of Pakistan in 1947 both the partners of the Cold War again became ally during the War on Terror. During the period of 1999 to 2013, a significant phase in the complex and sometimes troubled relationship between Pakistan and the US. Over about 14 years, there was a notable and dynamic interaction of geographical interests, strategic partnerships, and changing objectives that substantially impacted the trajectory of diplomatic relations and collaboration between the two states. During the tenure of General Pervez Musharraf and, subsequently, Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani, Pakistan emerged as a focal point of international scrutiny, contending with a diverse array of obstacles, including the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the intricate task of maintaining regional peace in South Asia.

Throughout this particular era, the bilateral relationship between the both states Pakistan and the United States was marked by alternating phases of collaboration and tense interactions. Pakistan was a significant partner in the United States counterinsurgency efforts, offering vital logistical assistance to coalition forces in Afghanistan and actively collaborating in the apprehension of al-Qaeda members. Conversely, the bilateral relationship was characterized by profound trust deficit, divergent interpretations, and domestic political factors that occasionally exerted pressure on the alliance.

This article analyses the intricate fabric of Pakistan-US relations from 1999 to 2013. It will examine the significant milestones, historical periods, and policy shifts shaping this bilateral relationship. In this analysis, we will explore how General Musharraf's military regime and Prime Minister Gilani's civilian administration have addressed many concerns, including self-aggrandizement, nuclear initiatives, and stability within the

international sphere. By conducting a comprehensive examination of this particular period, our objective is to provide insight into the trajectory taken by the two nations as they endeavoured to harmonize their domestic reconciliation efforts with the requirements imposed by an evolving global landscape.

Research Objectives

- To investigate the lack of trust between Pakistan and the US using the framework developed by Kenneth Waltz.
- To investigate the changing dynamics of the Pak-US collaboration during the Cold War and the contemporary world.

2. Literature Review

Riedel (2012) "In 1998, I wrote a memo to President Bill Clinton titled "Pakistan: The Most Dangerous Country in the World." In this book, the author constructs an image of Pakistan and its nuclear program. He projects Pakistan as a reactionary state on earth but forgot its problems with the neighboring country. Pakistan is a country facing terrorist attacks in the relationship with the US. During the reading, it is realised that the world blames the victim. The author forgot the formation of Al Qaeda and pointed out that Pakistan is responsible for all misdeeds. The author also has the perception of Pakistan's relationship with the US, and he provides that "Many Pakistanis believe the United States had a large hand in creating this monster. To some extent, they are right. America has been a fickle friend, sometimes acting as Pakistan's closest ally and sharing important secret programs, while at other times moving to isolate and impose sanctions against it".

3. Theoretical Framework

In this research paper, the theoretical framework has been adopted the Neo-Realism theory devised by Kenneth N. Waltz. The research topic "Analyzing the Dynamics of the Deadly Embrace: A Study of Pakistan-US Relations from Cold War Alliances to Contemporary Challenges." The study will highlight the importance of triangular levels of analysis "a man, the state, and the system." The three levels represent individual levels where this research will focus on the role of the leaders and democratic institutions and their influence in foreign policy decision-making. The state's role as a unitary actor at the second level will be assessed. At the third level, the anarchic nature of the international system and its impact on the states' decisions to safeguard their national interest will be discussed. This framework will help us to understand the relationship between the Pak-US and the dynamics from the Cold War to the War on Terror.

4. Methodology

This research paper will be conducted under the Neo-Realism approach adopted by Kenneth N. Waltz. This research will analyze the " " through three levels of analysis. The study of the Pak-US relationship would involve a mixed-methods approach combining quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. According to the book, "On the level of data, the combination may be oriented to transforming qualitative data into quantitative data and vice versa (Flick, 2009)." This research will open more room for other researchers to continue working.

Historical Background during the Cold War

The newborn state of Pakistan, facing a pressing requirement for both military and economic support, had no tangible resources except for its advantageous geographical location, which it might played to attract support from the US. Haqqani quotes Mr. Jinnah having said in an interview, "Americans need Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America. Pakistan is the pivot of the world, as we are placed . . . [on] the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves (Yousafzai, 2021)." Similarly, on October 18, 1948, the diplomatic message from Pakistan's embassy to the State Dept emphasized the significant global significance of Pakistan, underscoring the imperative not to underestimate or disregard its strategic value. Pakistan can potentially serve as a strategic location for establishing military and aviation bases during emergencies. The

containment policy persisted for over four decades until the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 (Nye & Welch, *Understanding global conflict and cooperation : an introduction to theory and history*, 2019). Several additional measures were implemented to ensure the effectiveness of the containment strategy. Pakistan, for instance, became a participant in this policy seven years after gaining independence. This occurred through its accession to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in 1955 (Bhutto, 1976).

Prior to Eisenhower's election as the 34th president of the US, the people of Pakistan desired a close relationship with the nation. However, additional support was required. In the 1950s, when the Korean War broke out, the US enlisted Pakistan in the expectation that it would send soldiers to Korea to fight alongside United Nations forces. This anticipation arose because of Liaquat Ali Khan's actions and statements during his June 1950 visit to Washington, during which he demanded American military and economic assistance and support on the Kashmir dispute. Pakistan, according to Prime Minister Liaquat, will "fully support measures recommended in Security Council resolutions for the cessation of hostilities" in the Korean War. He believed that Pakistan could receive economic and military assistance in exchange for troop deployment in Korea (Riedel, 2012) (Yousafzai, 2021, p. 3).

He subsequently withdrew because of inadequate assets and the Indian danger. Liaquat's government and bureaucracy disagreed on deploying the troops to Korea. A fair criticism was that Pakistan should not fight India if the US could not guarantee its security. Despite his greatest efforts, Liaquat failed to gain the US military or financial support throughout his term. Liaquat was assassinated in Rawalpindi during a public gathering on October 16, 1951. Khawaja Nazimuddin became Prime Minister thereafter. Karachi thought that if the Republican presidential candidate won, he would address its economic and military expectations. Five Pakistani delegations approached US authorities in Washington from October 1951 to December 1952 to request military aid, but Washington refused due to tensions with New Delhi (Kux, 2001).

In the wake of Indian threat over Kashmir issue Pakistan joined two military alliances on the wish of the US to contain the big neighbor and this decision was taken on the spirit of the national interest on the other hand the containment of the Soviet Union was the US national interest (Abbas, 2004).

In May 1954, Pakistan entered a mutual defence aid pact with the United States. Subsequently, Pakistan became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 and the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The Baghdad Pact ultimately transformed into the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) after Iraq's withdrawal in 1958. Both the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) were established to promote collective defence in response to the perceived danger of communism. The organization known as SATO was specified in September 1954 and included several countries, including Britain, France, the US, Pakistan, Philippines, New Zealand, Australia, and Thailand. Seto established the legal foundation upon which the United States justified its intervention in Vietnam. The Baghdad Pact was signed on February 24, 1955, in Baghdad, with the participation of Great Britain, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey. These accords established a legal framework for providing US military aid to Pakistan. Consequently, Pakistan was regarded as "America's most significant ally in the Asian region" (Yousafzai, 2021).

Pakistan had its military coup in October 1958, leading to Ayub Khan assuming the role of the first state of martial law administrator. Nevertheless, Ayub maintained the existing collaboration with the United States. The U.S.-Pakistan negotiations finally resulted in Pakistan aligning itself with the United States in their Cold War efforts against communism. In addition, Pakistan entered into an additional bilateral cooperation agreement in early 1959, intending to advance the Central Treaty Organization's (CENTO) goals. Reciprocally, Pakistan was receiving significant economic and military assistance.

The level of cooperation between both states significantly strengthened towards the conclusion of the 1950s, as Pakistan allowed the US government access to its military sites, including the Badaber facility near Peshawar. This strategic arrangement was deploying U-2 spy planes for surveillance missions over the Soviet Union. According to Selig H. Harrison, an American writer, the United States provides financial assistance to Pakistan in a manner that perpetuates its status as a garrison state, characterized by an excessively inflated military capability relative to its size (Lerski, 1968).

However, on May 1, 1960, the "U-2 spy plane" was downed by Soviet Union forces (Riedel, 2012). The revelation of the covert air facility, previously undisclosed, has emerged as a significant event with

implications of potential danger and embarrassment for Pakistan. During the Fifth Congress of the Supreme Soviet on May 5, 1960, Nikita Khrushchev addressed the assembly by stating, "Comrade Deputies! I believe that from this high rostrum one must issue the most serious warning to those countries, too, which place their territories at the disposal of aggressive forces and thus make it easier for these forces to act against us." Consequently, Pakistan has had challenges in securing both military and economic assistance. However, India is apprehensive about the defence cooperation between the United States and Pakistan. Nevertheless, due to India's commitment to a policy of non-alignment, establishing a robust partnership with Pakistan proved unattainable (Yousafzai, 2021).

In 1961, US President John F. Kennedy assumed the presidency and sought to enhance diplomatic ties with Pakistan and India. Nevertheless, President Kennedy perceived China as a substantial menace to the democratic nations and adopted a more conciliatory approach towards India's non-aligned strategy. The shift in perspective resulted in the emergence of Indo-US relations involving Pakistan.

In the context of the Indo-China War in 1962, the United States aligned itself with India, exacerbating tensions with Pakistan. Despite the assurances provided by Kennedy on the non-interference of Indo-US defense cooperation with Pak-US relations, it is noteworthy that Pakistan's geographical proximity to China has led to the establishment of defense collaboration between Pakistan and China. This collaboration encompasses the provision of ballistic missiles and Pakistan's involvement in the development of the arms industry of China (Yousafzai, 2021).

The military conflict 1965 between Pakistan and India resulted in a significant erosion of trust between the governments of the US and Pakistan. The US terminated its financial assistance and suspended economic aid, while Pakistan opted to shut down the American military installation in Peshawar. In 1965, President Ayub undertook a visit to Washington, during which he placed significant emphasis on the perceived danger posed by India and engaged in discussions about Pakistan's diplomatic ties with China. Nevertheless, the lack of substantial advancements can be attributed to divergent interests.

The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 resulted in a significant shift in diplomatic efforts, as his administration actively pursued the enhancement of relations with both the Soviet Union and China. Pakistan's closeness to China made it a natural choice for the US to interact with China. During an interview Rana Shamshad Ahmad Khan told that

“In 1970, Nixon came Pakistan and requested that Yahya Khan make us reconcile with your friend, China. This is what America requested of us. So, then Kissinger came to a secret mission. The people were told he was sick and was in Nathia Gali. But he flew to Beijing by plane. So, we have played vital role in changing the history of the world. We have changed the history of the world (Khan, 2023).”

The culmination of these events occurred in 1971 when Henry Kissinger undertook a covert journey to China, with the assistance of Pakistan, resulting in the initiation of diplomatic relations between the US and China and the bolstering of the bilateral ties between the US and Pakistan (Kux, 2001).

However, The East Pakistan Conflict of 1971 presented a further examination of the defence cooperation between the US and Pakistan, as Pakistan was in a confrontation with India. The worsening of the crisis in East Pakistan was attributed to the military's intervention, which was influenced by the internal political dynamics between the political parties of both the East and West wings. The potential for Indian peril and engagement was present. However, the leaders exhibited a self-centred disposition, disregarding the nation's integrity. The military was suppressing the Awami League's Awami Tehreek, a political party that emerged victorious in the election but was obstructed from assuming governance by the administration of West Pakistan. In 1965, Pakistan sought assistance from its defence ally, the United States, in response to a deteriorating situation and the impending threat of an Indian invasion. President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, supported Pakistan but military assistance was limited during 1965 war (Abbas, 2004).

Unfortunately, the authorities were unable to avert the fragmentation of Pakistan in 1971. During a meeting with President Nixon, Henry Kissinger expressed that the prevailing circumstances involved a situation when a nation aligned with the US was being subjected to an invasion by a regime supported by the Soviet Union and armed with Soviet weaponry. In an attempt to dissuade India from launching an offensive against West Pakistan, President Nixon authorized the deployment of a United States aircraft carrier to the

Bay of Bengal. However, this diplomatic effort ultimately proved ineffective. Kissinger subsequently informed Congress that the aircraft deployment to the Bay of Bengal was undertaken to curb Soviet influence in the Indian Ocean and preempt a potential incursion into West Pakistan.

On December 16, 1971, Indian troops entered Dhaka, where Pakistani forces had positioned guns. Bangladesh emerged as an independent nation from East Pakistan due to the involvement of India, with other internal factors contributing to this development (Alqama, 1997). The partition of East Pakistan was an obvious miscalculation by self-interested Pakistani leaders, but as the Indian army marched to Dhaka, Pakistan anticipated U.S. aid. The U.S. could not preserve Pakistan from disintegration. Nixon supported Pakistan, but Congress prevented him from acting. The Nixon administration knew East Pakistan would split while considering West Pakistan.

If the Indians attacked Pakistan's west, the US might take tangible action to stop them since its interests were there. It was enough for Indians to declare East Pakistan's independence. Pakistan, the most aligned partner, expected US help against India, but the US placed a weapons embargo on both nations. Nixon states in his memoir that when Pakistan proposed the 1959 bilateral security agreement, the "State of the Department found it hard to follow the White House strategy (which favored some action in support of Pakistan) or to break with three decades of sentimental attachment to India." Pakistan felt deceived, and some Pakistanis still harbor anti-American sentiments because the US opposed Pakistan despite an agreement. SEATO was a paper contract when Pakistan quit in 1973, having no cause to join (Yousafzai, 2021).

Following the fall of Dhaka, General Yahya Khan stepped down his authority and transferred control to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the esteemed leader of the Pakistan People's Party. In turmoil, Pakistan endeavored to sever its former affiliation with the US. The diplomatic ties between the two nations had deteriorated significantly, reaching an unprecedented nadir. Bhutto sought to diminish Pakistan's dependence on the United States and enhance its military capabilities in response to the perceived threat from India. To accomplish this objective, the individual in question cultivated relationships with oil-abundant nations in the Middle East, whose emigration of laborers substantially contributed to Pakistan's economic growth. Furthermore, Pakistan bolstered its bilateral relationships with China and forged diplomatic contacts with North Korea and Vietnam (Jaffrelot, 2016).

Congress received a 12-page US foreign policy report on the South Asia problem. The study said we pressed Indira Gandhi but needed to leave more time for a peaceful resolution. It also stated US pressure had prevented India from attacking West Pakistan. The situation embarrassed US diplomacy since US pressures did not impact India and Pakistan. US preventative action against invasion in western Pakistan would have been influenced by its strategic interests in the area, not Pakistan's strategic location (Yousafzai, 2021).

After setbacks, Bhutto desired good relations with Washington. However, the nuclear weapons issue dominated the worsening of the US-Pakistan partnership in the 1970s. Pakistan became defensive after Dhaka fell. After that, Bhutto took the initiative to make the atomic bomb, and in the wake of that, he invited Pakistan's finest 50 scientists, including Nobel Prize winner Abdus Salam, to build the nuclear bomb in early January 1972 to restore Pakistan's status. Thus, Pakistan began atomic weapon development in 1972. The Indian nuclear tests in Pokhran in May 1974 increased the "security dilemma" in the region. Pakistan's security fears and intensified their two-year-old program. Although Pakistan's nuclear development began in 1954 under the U.S. Atom for Peace Programs, the Indian nuclear test took place. In 1976, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan founded Kahuta Research Laboratories (KRL), strengthening Pakistan's nuclear program. Libya and Saudi Arabia helped finance the 'Islamic bomb' program (Tang, 2009).

Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's tenure is remembered for many ups and downs, which is the era of trust deficit. Because the US foreign policy was to contain the Soviet Union, on the other hand, Pakistani leadership tilted toward socialism, which was coined Islamic socialism. Unfortunately, Bhutto was hanged by his own beloved General Zia ul Haq. Once again, Pakistani foreign policy reverted to the US. History has witnessed that whenever the US has an interest in the region, especially in South Asia, the US change of regime policy prevails. The best examples are the following.

1958 Martial Law	General Ayub Khan Came to Power	The imposition of martial law in Pakistan occurred in 1958, leading to the ascension of Ayub Khan to a position of authority. Then, after two years, the U-2 incident took place. That incident made Pakistan a front-line state and heightened strain levels.
1977 Martial Law	General Zia ul Haq came to power	In 1977, martial law was implemented, resulting in General Zia's assumption of the presidency. Following two years, the US intervened in the region amidst the Soviet-Afghan War, resulting in Pakistan assuming the role of a front-line state and experiencing heightened strain.
1999 Martial Law	General Pervez Musharraf came to power	The imposition of martial law occurred in 1999, resulting in General Musharraf becoming the president. Following two years, the 9/11 event took place, thus positioning Pakistan as a front-line state and subjecting it to the threats of terrorism. And today, the world is blaming the victim.

The above chart is designed to understand how the US changes the regimes for its interest by forgetting the spirit of democracy.

During the Military regime of Zia ul Haq, both states engaged in the Soviet-Afghan war from 1979 to 1991. This marked the beginning of the Mujahideen, and both states once again became close allies. President Carter ordered National Security Advisor Brzezinski to Islamabad, where he provided a substantial sum of \$400 million in both financial and military assistance to Pakistan. This strategic move aimed to position Pakistan as a pivotal state in countering the Soviet Union's influence. However, Zia declined to accept the offer, considered as "peanuts (Levy & Clark, 2008)." On this occasion, one can analyze how the US wanted to win the war in a small amount. Still, Pakistan paid a massive amount for this regarding about 90000 civilian and security officials' casualties in different attacks. Pakistan became the victim of terrorism, but unfortunately, the world has forgotten and blamed the victim. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Pakistan became a second home for the refugees. Almost 3 million Afghan refugees were catered in the spirit of Islam. Watch the film "Charlie Wilson's War" for a better understanding (Nichols, 2007).

According to General Nasir Khan Janjua, former "National Security Advisor of Pakistan."

“Pakistan could not stop the movement of the Refugees because there was tension about how to feed them; that's why they were given the liberty to go everywhere; otherwise, Pakistan had to feed them. The freedom of movement allowed them to open Afghan restaurants in Pakistan, like Afghani Karahi, Afghani Pulao, etc. For your kind information, the United Nations (UN) gave the refugees 2 dollars per year. We could build the camps like Iran built the camps for refugees, but the poor economy made it impossible for Pakistan” (Janjua, 2023).

Hence, with Pakistan's help, the US won the last phase of the Cold War in 1991. Unfortunately, the US left the region in a hurry, which marked the beginning of terrorism. The US left the refugees' responsibility on the shoulders of Pakistan, even without building the road map, which is called the trust deficit. During this period, the US adopted the policy of a watchdog on Pakistan. For that, the US introduced the Pressler Amendment; undoubtedly, that was for the sake of NPT's successful implementation. Soon, the Amendment was lifted for national interest because trust cannot prevail when a trust deficit remains. Pakistan's nuclear program hampered US-Pakistan collaboration when it was at its pinnacle. Pakistan's Prime Minister Junejo visited the US in July 1986.

Junejo's visit brought Pakistan \$4.02 billion for six years.⁷⁵ However, the nuclear problem intensified the following year, causing harm to bilateral relations. US help to Pakistan was contingent on its nuclear program. Pakistan always claimed that its nuclear program was for benign purposes, but the US didn't trust it. US intelligence monitored nuclear activity and advised Congress and the State Department accordingly. US goals of rallying Mujahedeen in Afghanistan and forcing the Soviets out were contradictory. The US-USSR Cold War benefited Pakistan in military and economic terms and caused later problems like Kalashnikov culture and drugs. Pakistan aimed to work with the US for financial and military aid (Sattar, 2020).

The Geneva Accords, which were established in April 1988, facilitated the process of the Soviet Union's

withdrawal from Afghanistan. The Soviet Union was divided into 15 new states, including Russia. The world became unipolar under the leadership of America (Nye & Welch, 2019). In parallel, Pakistan's internal political strife ended after a prolonged negotiation and the sudden death of Zia ul Haq, a military dictator, in a plane crash near Bahawalpur. According to Rana Shamshad in an interview, "After Bhutto, Zia had a perfect relationship. However, Benazir herself came to power with the help of America. The one who made Benazir the Prime Minister, two senior State Department officials from America came to Islamabad to negotiate with the army. we know that your election is like this, but we want to make Benazir the Prime Minister (Ahmad, 2023)."

This was followed by a political compulsion to hold election power was handed over to the elected representative of the people. The election was held peacefully, and power was handed over to Benazir Bhutto (B.B.), the first female elected PM of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. B.B.'s era was fragile, and she could not complete her tenure. Pakistan was exposed to the fragile nature of its democratic system. The departure of B.B. was followed by yet another short period of democratic rule under Nawaz Sharif. Political leaders B.B. and Nawaz Sharif ruled the country briefly without completing their constitutional term.

It exposed the fragile nature of Pakistan's democratic culture. The final political drama ended when the then-elected Prime Minister directed the PIA authority to divert the incoming flight of the then-Commander Chief General Musharraf, returning from Sri Lanka after an official visit. General Musharraf explained a detailed political assessment of this political chaos very well in his book entitled "In the Line of Fire." Military leadership intervened, and Nawaz Sharif's short era came to an end by a long Musharraf's military rule (Musharraf, 2006).

The US policy to exploit Pakistan's aid for non-proliferation failed when Pakistan performed its nuclear experiments on May 28, 1998. Pakistan likewise rejected the CTBT. After the democratic system collapsed on October 12, 1999, the US reevaluated its position. President Clinton said his brief visit to Pakistan following his lengthy visit to India will not improve Pakistan's political situation. The US pressed Musharraf to hold elections to restore democracy in Pakistan. Before 9/11, Pakistan was facing US sanctions, weakening Pak-US ties (Rafique, 2017).

The US initially opposed the October 12, 1999, military takeover in Pakistan, President Bush eventually praised Musharraf's rule for bringing stability to the area. Even though the US supported the Pakistani military takeover, ties were strained. Before 9/11, Pak-US relationships were strained over the nuclear issue and US economic sanctions on Pakistan. The US reconsidered Pakistan's strategy after 9/11. On September 22, 2001, President Bush authorized a fresh Pakistani package that lifted all restrictions. The US is regularly condemned for supporting dictatorships in Pakistan and other Middle Eastern, African, and other countries, despite her claim to be the best democracy. According to Bruce Riedel "America was about to again fall in love with a man in uniform (Riedel, 2012, p. 62)."

This was the matter of national interest in which the US supported military regime in Pakistan. Unfortunately, the promotor of democracy fell in love with a man in uniform. Moreover, After the UN passed resolution 1363 on July 30, 2001, Pakistan permitted UN monitors to monitor the Pak-Afghan border to track armaments from Pakistan to Afghanistan and vice versa. Pakistan first helped the Afghan Taliban and NATO members negotiate after 9/11. When the Taliban refused to hand over Osama bin Laden to the US at Pakistan's request, Pakistan formally discontinued ties with Afghanistan. Pakistan joined the US-led alliance to combat the WOT on US pressure.

According to Major General Rashid Qureshi served as the Director General Inter-Services Public Relations (D.G. ISPR) from 1998 to 2003 "He said the US asked Pakistan to hand over Osama Bin Laden to them. The Afghans said, "No, he is our guest. However, inform us about the charges against him, and we will try him in the courts of Afghanistan. However, the US disagreed. I remember that, at that time, the Americans were furious. The President, Foreign Minister, Foreign Secretary & intelligence agencies started talking about revenge. DG ISI, Lt General Mahmud Ahmed, was there and asked whether he would support them (Qureshi, 2021)." After the 9/11 incident the US asked Pakistan for support in the War on Terror by providing a demand list which was consist of seven.

1. "Stop Al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, intercept arms shipments through Pakistan, and end ALL logistical support for Osama bin Laden.
2. Give blanket overflight and landing rights to U.S. aircraft.
3. Give the U.S. access to Pakistani naval and air bases and to the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan.
4. Turn over all intelligence and immigration information.
5. Condemn the 11 September attacks and curb all domestic expressions of support for terrorism.
6. Cut off all shipments of fuel to the Taliban, and stop Pakistani volunteers from going into Afghanistan to join the Taliban.
7. Note that, should the evidence strongly implicate Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network in Afghanistan, and should the Taliban continue to harbor him and his accomplices, Pakistan will break diplomatic relations with the Taliban regime, end support for the Taliban, and assist the U.S. in the aforementioned ways to destroy Osama and his network (Abbas, 2004) (Fayyaz, 2020).

On that, Pakistan accepted all unconditionally to make good relations with the Americans. Pak-US relations after the 9/11 incident took many turns. One can say that the relations changed dynamically after the cooperation vis a vis trust deficit. For example, both the states started the War on Terror at the same time and remained suspicious about each other. The Americans were not satisfied on the policy of General Musharraf because he adopted the policy of differ between good Taliban and bad Taliban. On that policy the US official said that "Running with the hare, hunting with the hounds (Fayyaz, 2020)."

Under Musharraf and Bush, Pak-US connections took turns like roller coaster: collaboration, suspicions, and expectations. Even then, Pakistan had the finest US relations under Musharraf. The Obama administration was initially optimistic about Pakistani assistance in the war on terror, and the president often acknowledged it. Afterward, trust between the nations, notably the CIA-ISI partnership, was low. The US regularly accused Pakistan of sheltering terrorist organizations (Schaffer & Schaffer, 2011).

Despite the fact that Pakistan gave full logistical support to allies. Pakistan gave the US Jacobabad, Shamsi, Dalbandin, and Parni military bases. Pakistan sent 35000 troops to the border and apprehended 420 Taliban and Al-Qaida militants. Coalition troops received technical and human intelligence help. The US quickly granted \$1 billion grant, paid off \$1 billion debt, and gave \$1.2 billion for weaponry. The US provided Pakistan \$3 billion in financial support and military training. Unfortunately, conflict killed many troops and civilians. Suicides and bombings occurred frequently. About 200,000 men were on the frontline, and 90,000 were fighting.

The country suffered from North and South Waziristan terrorism to settle KPK and Capital. The US lost public support. US aid to Pakistan since 2002 was \$8.5 billion, but economic loss was \$43 billion. The US emphasizes South Asia peace and stability. In South Asia, the war on terror united both countries for peace and stability. South Asian nuclear powers India and Pakistan have ballistic missile systems. After 9/11, the US wanted to bring these countries closer without conflict for South Asia's stability and security. Thus, the US is working with Pakistan to reestablish peace in Afghanistan. South Asian countries are essential for manpower and economy. The US also seeks maximum gains from this (Nagra, Mustafa, & Imran, 2019).

There are also various levels of understanding of trust deficits between Pakistan and the US. There is a longstanding trust deficit within Pakistan and the US. After 9/11, their strategic collaboration was clear, but the Abbottabad assassination of Osama bin Laden on 2 May 2011 strained relations. The US distrusted Pakistan due of its connections with neighboring countries. The US-China relationship is tense. It criticizes Pakistan's connection with China. Washington is friends with Kabul and New Delhi, but Pakistan is not. Conflicting regional interests also breeds mistrust. Pakistan dislikes the India-US civil nuclear pact. The Gwadar Port project harms America. The US opposes the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Despite US resistance, Pakistan and Iran reached a gas pipeline agreement.

US-Pakistan ties are also hampered by nuclear worries. Historically, Pakistan's nuclear program has been crucial to the Pak-US relationship. When Pakistan initiated this program, the US opposed it. Indian atomic explosion in May 1998 prompted US pressure on Pakistan to avoid atomic detonation. While ignoring global and US pressure, Pakistan exploded a nuclear device on May 28, 1998. The US president sanctioned Pakistan after the nuclear catastrophe. The US abolished these restrictions after 9/11.

We pressured both nations to sign CTBT and NPT. Pakistan was heavily criticized for providing uranium to North Korea in 2002. Pakistan was accused of aiding Iran and Libya with nuclear weapons in 2003. A 2004 scandal accused Dr. A.Q. Khan of nuclear proliferation in North Korea, Iran, and Libya. These actions increased US concerns about Pakistan's nuclear development. The US hesitated to deploy nuclear power plants in Pakistan and requested China for international reasons.

US drone attacks are another major cause of Islamabad-Washington mistrust. Pakistanis view drone attacks as violating their sovereignty, and the US was criticized for it. In 2008, President Musharraf and US officials agreed on drone attacks. US officials have long been wary of Pakistan's Islamic character. That problem bubbled in Pakistan during Zia's rule yet benefited America. However, Washington linked Pakistani religious fundamentalism to global terrorism. Americans wanted Talibanization in Pakistan (Nagra, Mustafa, & Imran, 2019, p. 568)

5. Conclusion

What conclusion can we draw based on our past relationships with the US? In short, it is a relationship between a weak state with a superpower where the benefits are both. Pakistan is ever willing to remain in the US camp to protect its military and economic interests received from the days of Ayub Khan. Our Military rulers have benefitted the most from such an alliance. Ayub Khan's 10 years of rule, Zia Haq's 11 years of rule, and Musharraf's about 9 years of rule are living examples of how our military rulers remained attached to the American camp. Yahya's short rule is also an example of how our military rulers brought China and the US closer to each other. During the Yahya's short tenure in power, however, it is important to point out that during our period of internal strife and war with India, the US remained an observer only and did not come to Pakistan's help where we were at with India both in 1965 and 71. Hence, the lesson is that if we want to retain our sovereignty and reduce our dependency on the US, we have to develop and depend on our resources and initiate dialogue with our neighbors to reduce conflict and increase cooperation. It is right to say that the Foreign Policy begins at home. This will lead to peace within and peace without, as perceived by our founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was very explicit when he explained Pakistan's long-term policy as a nation. Today, we are living in an increasingly interdependent world. Where we must focus on the economic well-being of our people. Conflict, Cooperation, and Competition are the basic rules of the game. The world is fast running away from hard power to soft power. The traditional state-centric security paradigm is being replaced with a soft power paradigm focused on human development. Europe today is the best example of cooperation and competition. It fought two wars known in the pages of history as the First and Second World Wars. Today is an integrated European Union. The ideological divide of the Cold War era has given birth to cooperation and competition in an open market as well as the War on Terror. The US is the biggest promoter of a market economy with democracy as the political paradigm of a future world. So, as an ally of the US since 1958, we have to follow the political paradigm constructed by the US as an essential component of our foreign policy.

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